St. John's Law Review
Volume 67
Number 4 Volume 67, Fall 1993, Number 4

Article 11

Avoiding a Landmine: A Practitioner's Guide to Disarming the
Reasonably Equivalent Value Requirement of Section 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code
Scott Todd Salmonson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

AVOIDING A LANDMINE: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO DISARMING
THE REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE
REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 548 OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code1 enables a trustee in
bankruptcy to set aside a foreclosure sale as a fraudulent transfer
if a transferor does not receive "reasonably equivalent value."2 In

light of the vast power this term confers upon a trustee, it is ironic
that a clear definition is conspicuously absent from the Bank-

11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988). Section 548 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the
debtor voluntarily or involuntarily(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for such transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such
transfer or obligation.
Id. (emphasis added).
2 Id.; see, e.g., Pembroke Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re
Pembroke Dev. Corp.), 124 B.R. 398, 400 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) (stating that court
must scrutinize all aspects of transaction in determining whether debtor received reasonably equivalent value); Brown v. Vanguard Holding Corp., 119 B.R. 413, 415
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (mem.) (deciding that inadequacy of price alone is insufficient
to determine dispositively whether debtor received reasonably equivalent value); IPI
Liberty Village Assocs. v. Spalding Corners Assocs. (In re IPI Liberty Village Assocs.),
92 B.R. 882, 884 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.) (noting that court must compare amount paid
with value of property instead of bid price to determine reasonably equivalent value),
affd, 82 B.R. 507 (W.D. Mo. 1987). See generally Robert Burford, Note, CanMortgage
ForeclosureSales Really be FraudulentConveyances Under § 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 22 Hous. L. REv. 1221, 1245-49 (1985) (explaining Uniform Fraudulent
Transfers Actes relation to current reasonably equivalent value standard); William A.
Walsh, In Re Bundles: Findinga New Basis for Determining 'ReasonablyEquivalent
Value" Under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 175, 178-92
(1990) (discussing evolution of reasonably equivalent value requirement and current
problems of interpretation); Robert M. Zinman et al., FraudulentTransfersAccording
to Alden, Gross and Borowitz: A Tale of Two Circuits, 39 Bus. LAw. 977, 1003-04
(1984) (summarizing historical background behind promulgation of reasonably
equivalent value requirement currently in Bankruptcy Code).
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ruptcy Code.3 Historically, this omission has proven to be a serious problem, particularly in the area of mortgage foreclosures. 4
Courts primarily employ four different methods to ascertain
whether reasonably equivalent value has been received at a mortgage foreclosure sale. 5 None of these judicially created ap3 See Mark E. Budnitz, The Duties Imposed by Bankruptcy Courts Upon Mortgagees at Foreclosure Sales: How to Avoid Avoidance Under Section 548, 46 Bus. LAw.
1183, 1184 (1991) (noting that Bankruptcy Code does not define term "reasonably
equivalent value"); Walsh, supra note 2, at 177 (maintaining that reasonably
equivalent value is difficult to ascertain due to Code's lack of definition); Burford,
supra note 2, at 1243 (indicating that Bankruptcy Code did not consider issue of reasonably equivalent value); see also Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 378; 1A B 'xRupTcy SERVICE, LAWYER'S
EDITION § 5D:45 (Timothy E. Travers et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter BA-iNaupTrcy SERVICE] (stating that Bankruptcy Code fails to define reasonably equivalent value). See
generally 2 BAXTER DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 25.03[3][b][iv]
n.35 (1993) (discussing 1984 amendments to section 548 of Bankruptcy Code).
4 Numerous cases have grappled with the issue of whether reasonably equivalent
value was received at a mortgage foreclosure sale. See, e.g., Hussey v. Haider (In re
Haider), 126 B.R. 796, 800 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1991) (finding forced sale for 62% of
property's appraised value not reasonably equivalent); Sims v. Talman Home Mortgage (In re Sims), 112 B.R. 259, 262 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (avoiding foreclosure sale
as fraudulent transfer even though creditor met requirements of state foreclosure
law); Kachanizadeh v. Denlinger (In re Kachanizadeh), 108 B.R. 734, 738 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1989) (presuming reasonably equivalent value where state foreclosure proceedings were followed); National Envtl. Sys. v. Long Pond Realty Trust (In re National Envtl. Sys. Corp.), 111 B.R. 4, 9 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989) (determining reasonably
equivalent value on case-by-case basis).
5 See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1980).
The Durrett doctrine has been interpreted to mean that reasonably equivalent value
has not been achieved and the transfer may be avoided as fraudulent if the consideration received is less than 70% of the property's fair market value. See, e.g., Cole v.
Sovran Mortgage Corp. (In re Cole), 81 B.R. 326, 329 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). The
second approach, adopted by the Madrid court, creates an irrebuttable presumption
of reasonably equivalent value if the transfer is the result of a "non-collusive and
regularly-conducted foreclosure sale." See Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re
Madrid), 21 B.R. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), affd on other grounds, 725 F.2d
1197, 1201-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984). The third approach, used
by the Bundles court, adopts a rebuttable presumption that the price received at a
foreclosure sale is reasonably equivalent value and suggests that courts examine the
totality of circumstances in each case. See Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d
815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988).
Finally, the last category of cases addressing reasonably equivalent value applies
a hybrid approach, which combines portions of the previous three theories. One of the
more popular cases espousing this concept was Lindsay v. Beneficial Reins. Co. (In re
Lindsay), 98 B.R. 983, 991 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989). The Lindsay court used a threepart test to determine whether reasonably equivalent value was received at a mortgage foreclosure sale. Id. First, the court considered whether the foreclosure sale was
noncollusive and conducted in accordance with state law. Id. Second, the court examined the totality of circumstances surrounding the foreclosure sale to determine if
commercially reasonable steps were taken to obtain the best price. Id. If both of these
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proaches, however, provide an adequate definition of reasonably
equivalent value. 6 Given this inadequacy and the judiciary's failure to resolve it, 7 it is submitted that a myriad of interpretations
of the term, each with similar shortcomings, will continue to arise
absent a legislative change to section 548.8
elements are satisfied, the court deems the purchase price received to be reasonably
equivalent value. Id. If the sale was not commercially reasonable, the next step is to
examine the price actually received at the mortgage foreclosure sale as another factor
in determining whether reasonably equivalent value was received. Id. The Lindsay
approach combines the Madrid and Bundles methods.
6 See Frank R. Kennedy, Involuntary FraudulentTransfers, 9 CARDozo L. REv.
531, 578 (1987). Proponents of the Durrettdoctrine argue that it will yield an increase
in the proceeds of property sold at a foreclosure sale. See id. Increasing the foreclosure
price received will result in a more equitable distribution of compensation to the creditors. See id. at 577-78; Walsh, supra note 2, at 189-92. Advocates of the Madrid approach assert that utilizing an irrebuttable presumption based on the procedure followed at a foreclosure sale will establish a market in which foreclosed property can be
disposed of rapidly and permanently. Id. Supporters of the case-by-case or Bundles
theory argue that this doctrine is the most equitable because the court examines the
facts and circumstances of each particular case. See id. at 192-95; see also HenryLuqueer Properties, Inc. v. Mayo (In re Henry-Luqueer Properties, Inc.), 145 B.R. 771,
774-75 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting courts that prefer flexible case-by-case
approach).
The Lindsay approach is currently popular as it creates the benefit of a rebuttable presumption of reasonably equivalent value if state foreclosure procedures are
followed, yet permits an examination into the facts and circumstances of each particular case. See, e.g., Haider,126 B.R. at 799 (stating that court must examine totality of
circumstances); Brown, 119 B.R. at 415.
But see Robert M. Zinman, Noncollusive, Regularly Conducted ForeclosureSales:
Involuntary,Nonfraudulent Transfers, 9 CARDozo L. REv. 581, 589-99 (1987). Opponents of the Durrett approach assert that it is too inflexible. See id. at 594-95. Fair
market value is not considered a sufficient basis for evaluating a foreclosure sale because the risks inherent in the foreclosure process almost invariably result in a lower
price than that which would have been received if the property were sold in a fair
market. Id. at 602; Scott B. Ehrlich, Avoidance of ForeclosureSales as Fraudulent
Conveyances: Accommodating State & Federal Objectives, 71 VA. L. REv. 933, 963
(1985) (arguing that Durrett case-by-case analysis fosters uncertainty in finality of
foreclosure sales).
Critics ofMadrid assert that irrebuttably presuming reasonably equivalent value
if proper foreclosure procedures are followed unnecessarily prevents inquiry into the
facts of each case, thereby resulting in potential inequities. Id. at 956-67. Adversaries
of Bundles argue that examining the facts and circumstances of all cases encourages
litigation. Walsh, supra note 2, at 194-95.
7 See supra note 5 (discussing judicial attempts in Durrett,Madrid,and Bundles
to define reasonably equivalent value). Furthermore, since the most recent method
adopts a hybrid approach combining various elements of already existing methods,
see, e.g., Brown, 119 B.R. at 415, Lindsay, 98 B.R. at 991, the potential exists for an
infinite amount of permutations, resulting in judicial solutions with similar character
flaws.
8 See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text (detailing problem of defining reasonably equivalent value and insufficient judicial responses).
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This Note suggests measures which establish a feasible mechanism for ascertaining the meaning of reasonably equivalent
value. Part I discusses the policy implications underlying mortgage foreclosure and proposes an amendment to section 548 which
clearly defines reasonably equivalent value. Part II presents an
examination of the proposed statutory elements, explaining the
legal justification behind each one. Part III provides practitioners
with a series of suggestions aimed at minimizing the probability
that a foreclosure sale will be avoided for failure to provide reasonably equivalent value. Finally, Part IV discusses the Supreme
Court's recent grant of certiorari regarding this issue and demonstrates the usefulness of the proposed statutory amendment, regardless of the case's outcome.
I.

A.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SECTION

548

Policy Implications

A prerequisite to an effective legislative remedy is a fundamental understanding of the policy considerations which underlie
our current mortgage foreclosure system.9 From a federal perspective, section 548 seeks to maximize recovery for the creditors. 10 Coexisting with this view is the state's interest in provid9 See 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAuDuLENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 60, at 82
(rev. ed. 1940) (identifying Roman law as recognizing and addressing fraudulent conveyance problem); Max Radin, FraudulentConveyances atRoman Law, 18 VA. L. REv.
109, 110-11 (1931) (stating purposes of Roman fraudulent transfer law similar to reasons for existing law); see also Kennedy, supra note 6, at 536 (noting that Statute of
13 Elizabeth is predecessor to modern Anglo-American fraudulent transfer law);
Louis E. Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1617 (1919) (summarizing recourse under early English law for creditors who were victims of fraud); Zinman, supra note 6, at 583-84 (stating 13 Elizabeth precursor of
American fraudulent transfer law as well as Twyne's Case bore concept of fraudulent
transfer law by denominating "badges of fraud"). See generally Rhett Frimet, The
Birth of Bankruptcy in the United States, 96 CoM. L.J. 160 (1991) (analyzing development of bankruptcy law in United States).
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988) (enabling court to avoid foreclosure sale as
fraudulent transfer if reasonably equivalent value not received); supra note 1 (reproducing pertinent part of § 548); see also Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 933 (claiming that
federal foreclosure laws attempt to maximize creditor recovery); Michael L. Walcott,
Comment, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Transfers Under Section
548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code: An Impetus to Changing State ForeclosureProcedures,
66 NEB. L. REV. 383, 409-10 (1987) (noting that bankruptcy law allows federal courts
to protect interest of debtor); Walsh, supra note 2, at 196 (indicating federal government, through Bankruptcy Code, seeks to protect debtor's estate in "economical
manner").
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ing a liquid market in which creditors may expediently dispose of

their security interests."
1.

Investment Risks

Under the existing system, the many variables inherent in
the process of mortgage foreclosure sales create a high degree of
investment risk.' 2 Due to this risk, prospective real estate buyers
offer less money for the property, often resulting in highly discounted purchases.' 3 The probability that a trustee will be able to
avoid a conveyance as fraudulent increases when bidders tender
11 See Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 933 (citing state goal in foreclosure sales as providing mortgagees with forum to sell property quickly and permanently); see also
David H. Fishman, The Foreclosure Sale, in 3 THE ACREL PAPERS 47, 47-59 (1992)
(discussing problems common to most state foreclosure proceedings). But cf 4 CoLLER ON BAaupTcy
541.01 (Lawrence A. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1993) (arguing
that states should adopt UFTA to bring state objectives in line with federal goals). See
generally Frank R. Kennedy, The Uniform FraudulentTransferAct, 18 UCC L.J. 195
(1986) (suggesting that state and federal goals may be at odds in area of fraudulent
transfers because states have not uniformly adopted UFTA).
12 See 1 DUNAWAY, supranote 3, § 14.04[6][c]. One potential risk for purchasers is
the equity of redemption, which enables a mortgagor to pay the foreclosure price and
take back the property. Id.; see also Corrie M. Anders, Don't Close Door on Buying
ForeclosedProperty, CH. TRm., Feb. 23, 1992, at 1M (maintaining that prospective
home buyers should consider foreclosed properties sold by Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and Resolution Trust Corporation, but must evaluate high risk involved); Robert J. Bruss, Risky Business, As is,' in Simple English Means 'Buyer Beware', Cm. Tam., Sept. 25, 1992, at C4 (asserting that potential home purchasers
should carefully evaluate risk before buying foreclosed property); Shawn G. Kennedy,
Forthe Long Term Make Sure You Know What You're Buying Experts Say, Cm. TRm.,
Sept. 18, 1992, at D2 (noting that those purchasing foreclosed property may receive
tremendous discounts but risk buying real estate in poor physical condition); Annemarie Roketenetz, Patience, Sweat Equity Needed in Many Foreclosures, WASH.
TIsS, Jan. 29, 1993, at H16 (highlighting that people who have lost everything including their homes sometimes take it out on their house).
13 See NAA Statement Regarding RTC's Premier Commercial Auction in Palm
Springs Calif., PR Newswire, Nov. 23, 1991, availablein DIALOG, File No. 613 (auction sales enable buyers to obtain highly discounted property); Christopher Wood, Investors PurchaseMortgages to Take Property in Foreclosure, DENV. Bus. J., June 19,
1992, § 1, at 6 (asserting that buyers can acquire foreclosure property with less competition and at greater discounts); see also Maggie Farley, Some GreatBuys May Turn
Sour; Bankruptcy Snarls Revere Condo Sale, BOSTON GLOBE, June 12, 1992, at 63
(demonstrating high risks that purchasers incur at foreclosure sales); David Johnston, Real Estate Brokers Say Buyers Beware of ForeclosureActions, Gannett News
Service, Nov. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (noting that bidders at foreclosure sale may be better off buying from bank after sale concluded);
David Johnston, Renovating a Run-Down Home Risky, But Can Reap Rewards, Gannett News Service, Mar. 18, 1991, at 1 (maintaining that foreclosure purchasers may
get good buys if willing to do repair work themselves); Kennedy, supra note 12 (finding that discounts on distressed property can range from 20 to 40%).
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small consideration because reasonably equivalent value will not
be deemed received.' 4 Amending section 548 to provide a method
to determine reasonably equivalent value'" would assist prospective purchasers at mortgage foreclosure sales in ascertaining
whether a court would be inclined to avoid the transfer.' 6 Increases in the amount raised at mortgage foreclosure sales would
17
be the logical consequence of a system with less inherent risk.
The resultant increase in proceeds would markedly decrease the
potential for avoidance of the sale for failure to produce reasonably equivalent value.'"
14 See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1980)
(finding no decision where reasonably equivalent value deemed received when less
than 70% of fair market value given); Hernandez v. Canter (In re Hernandez), 150
B.R. 29, 30 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993) (following Durrett);see also Bundles v. Baker (In
re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988) (ruling that bankruptcy court must
ultimately focus on fair market value as effected by foreclosure); General Indus., Inc.
v. Shea (In re General Indus., Inc.), 79 B.R. 124, 133 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (stating
price received very important in determining reasonably equivalent value).
15 See Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823 (noting that Congress should address any policy
issues regarding definition of reasonably equivalent value); First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Hulm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990
(1984) (same); Lindsay v. Beneficial Reins. Co. (In re Lindsay), 98 B.R. 983, 990
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989) (urging Congress to provide feasible definition of reasonably
equivalent value).
16 See Abramoff v. Life Ins. Co. (In re Abramoff), 92 B.R. 698, 703 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1988) (noting that Bankruptcy Code's failure to define reasonably equivalent
value leaves interpretation to courts); Joing v. 0 & P Partnership (In re Joing), 82
B.R. 495, 498 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (mem.) (noting that court cannot formulate
black letter rule because of infinite permutations in which reasonably equivalent
value may arise); Fargo Builtmore Motor Hotel Corp. v. Metropolitan Fed. Bank (In re
Fargo Builtmore Motor Hotel Corp.), 49 B.R. 782, 788 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (asserting
that phrase "reasonably equivalent value" has been interpreted to mean various
things in different contexts). See generally BANKRauircY SERVICE, supra note 3,
§ 5D:45 (analyzing meaning of phrase 'reasonably equivalent value").
17 See JAmEs E. HIBDON, PRICE AND WELFARE THEORY 355-58 (1969) (claiming
that unpredictability increases risk and results in lower prices); DANmL ORR, PROPERTY MARKETS AND GovERNMENT INTERVENTION 107-10 (1976) (pointing out that price
reduction may decrease sales of "inferior goods"); see also Joseph J. Spengler, Smith
Verses Hobbes:Economy Verses Polity, in THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 1776-1976 BIcENTENNIAL ESSAYS 35, 40-43 (Fred R. Gleale ed., 1978) (stating that markets are selfregulating and less governmental restrictions will result in optimal pricing).
18 See, e.g., National Envtl. Sys. v. Long Pond Realty Trust (In re National Envtl.
Sys.), 111 B.R. 4, 9-12 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989) (considering price among variety of factors in determining reasonably equivalent value); Coleman v. Home Sav. Ass'n (In re
Coleman), 21 B.R. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding 28% of market value not
reasonably equivalent value under Durrett approach); Wickham v. United Am. Bank
(In re Thompson), 18 B.R. 67, 70 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (finding 80% of fair market
value to be reasonably equivalent value).
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State Foreclosure Proceedings

Historically, the regulation of foreclosure proceedings has
been a matter of state law. 19 Permitting the states to elaborately
dictate the steps constituting proper foreclosure presents a prob-

lem, however, in cases in which the Bankruptcy Code is implicated. 20 Absent an amendment to the Code, an unsuspecting
mortgagee who complies with rigorous state foreclosure procedures still risks having the sale set aside by a bankruptcy court
based on its interpretation of federal law. 2 1 Thus, under the current system, compliance with state foreclosure requirements may
be rendered irrelevant by the mechanism for determining reasonably equivalent value.2 2 Additionally, the present approaches for
evaluating reasonably equivalent value rely primarily on hindsight.2 3 This often leads to inequitable results because the partici19 See, e.g., Amz. Ruv. STAT. ANN. § 33-721 (1990) (indicating requirements for
judicial mortgage foreclosure under Arizona state law); CAL. Cirv. PROC. CODE § 580(d)
(Deering Supp. 1994) (stating deficiency judgments not available to creditors following trustee sale under California law); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-14 (West Supp.
1993) (governing strict foreclosure in Connecticut); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.031 (West
Supp. 1993) (governing judicial foreclosure as performed in Florida); see also Butner
v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) (noting that Congress generally allows states
to determine property rights of bankrupt's estate); In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1379
(3d Cir. 1987) (stating that laws governing regulation of property have been traditionally left to states).
20 See Robert E. Richards, Jr., Note, Mortgage Foreclosure& Bankruptcy in Massachusetts:Is a Lawful State Foreclosure a FraudulentTransfer?, 25 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 325 (1990). Mortgagees may foreclose by strictly complying with Massachusetts
state laws only to have the sale avoided for failing to achieve reasonably equivalent
value. Id. This result occurs even though Massachusetts uses the Bundles or case-bycase method of evaluating reasonably equivalent value. Id.
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir.
1980). Courts using the Durrett method of measuring reasonably equivalent value
will only examine the price received at the foreclosure sale to determine if it is equal
to 70% of the property's fair market value. Id. In these jurisdictions, compliance with
state foreclosure proceedings may be irrelevant for purposes of determining reasonably equivalent value because price received is the only factor examined. Id.
23 See supra note 5. Excluding the Madrid approach, each method utilized in determining reasonably equivalent value uses some measure of hindsight. See id. For
example, a court using the Durrett approach evaluates fair market value, a concept
which is analyzed by retroactively examining factors which may be unknown to the
parties at the time of the foreclosure sale. See Durrett,621 F.2d at 203. Courts using a
case-by-case or hybrid approach examine a multitude of factors which differ depending on the facts of each case. See Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 82425 (7th Cir. 1988); Lindsay v. Beneficial Reins. Co. (In re Lindsay), 98 B.R. 983, 991
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989). Practical application of each of these approaches results in a
court retrospectively examining the facts and circumstances in each case to determine
if the foreclosing seller achieved reasonably equivalent value. Id.
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pants in a mortgage foreclosure sale do not have the benefit of
future knowledge in evaluating the consideration offered at a
mortgage foreclosure sale. 2 4 It is submitted that providing an
amendment to the Federal Bankruptcy Code would alleviate these
problems.2 5
B. ProposedAmendment
The proposed amendment would apply only to real estate
mortgage foreclosures 26 and would read as follows:
§ 548(e) Reasonably Equivalent Value
(1) For purposes of this section, reasonably equivalent value is
given by a person acquiring an interest in an asset pursuant to a
regularly-conducted, noncollusive, and commercially reasonable
foreclosure sale, deed of trust, security agreement, or execution
of a power of sale upon default under a mortgage.
(2) The price obtained shall not be considered by a court in determining whether the sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. A sale approved in any judicial proceeding
shall be conclusively presumed to be commercially reasonable. If
a sale was not judicially approved, the court may consider the
method, manner, time, place, terms of the sale, and other factors,
including the following, in determining whether the sale was
commercially reasonable:
(A) Whether notice of foreclosure was served on the debtor
and any subordinate lienholder whose interest is recorded at
least thirty days prior to the proposed sale or lis pendens,
whichever occurs earlier, or whether such parties in fact had
notice of the foregoing proceedings;
(B) The extent, frequency, and degree of public notice
achieved by advertising in newspapers of general circulation;
By contrast, the Madridtest adopts an irrebuttable presumption that reasonably
equivalent value is achieved if the foreclosing seller complies with state foreclosure
procedure. See Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp. (In re Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197,
1201-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1989). Thus, this approach is the only
one where the mortgagee can be sure to achieve reasonably equivalent value by complying with state foreclosure law. Id.; see supra note 5 (describing four existing tests).
24 See Zinman, supra note 6, at 597. Mortgagees do not have the benefit of knowing the future when prices are accepted at foreclosure sales. Id. Consequently, allowing judges to examine the propriety of a sale using 20/20 hindsight is especially
dangerous. Id.
25 See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (asserting amendment to Federal Bankruptcy Code is optimal way to resolve foregoing problems).
26 Evaluation of the impact of the proposal on other types of foreclosure sales is
beyond the scope of this Note.
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(C) Whether a title report was provided for inspection to prospective purchasers prior to the foreclosure sale, and the date
of the report, if so provided; and
(D) The length of the period from default to foreclosure of the
debtor's equity of redemption, or expiration of any right of
redemption under nonbankruptcy law.
(3) If the court determines that the sale was not commercially
reasonable, the court may examine the price paid in relation to
the liquidation value of the property at the time of the sale to
determine whether reasonably equivalent value was received.
The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at
a different time or in a different method pursuant to nonbankruptcy law is not, by itself, sufficient to establish that the sale
price did not provide a reasonably equivalent value.

C. Objectives of ProposedAmendment
The purpose of promulgating this amendment to section 548
is to provide lenders and purchasers with a uniform method of determining when reasonably equivalent value is received at a mortgage foreclosure sale. As discussed above, the risks inherent in
the foreclosure process virtually ensure that real property foreclosure sales never achieve prices attainable in open, fair market
sales.28 Moreover, if the foreclosure sales involve commercial real
27 See Lindsay, 98 B.R. at 989-90. Economic problems underlying the concept of
reasonably equivalent value as defined in section 548 of Federal Bankruptcy Code are
best resolved by Congress. Id. at 990; see Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823. The solution to
defining the term is to amend section 548. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Huim (In re
Hulm), 738 F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); see also Madrid,

725 F.2d at 1202.
Although the American Land & Title Association reacted to the Durrett decision
by proposing an amendment to section 548, Congress instead chose to include mortgage foreclosures within the definition of a transfer under § 548. See 2 DUNAWAY,
supra note 3, § 27B.0412][b](iii). A statutory amendment was suggested as the optimal way to resolve the Durrett problem, but was rejected by Congress. Alden et al.,
Real Property Foreclosure as a Fraudulent Conveyance: Proposalsfor Solving the
Durrett Problem, 38 Bus. LAw. 1605, 1610 (1983).
28 See Madrid,725 F.2d at 1202 (stating that economic value received at foreclosure sale is frequently less than fair market value); Abramson v. Lakewood Bank &
Trust Co. (In re Abramson), 647 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1981) (Clark, J., dissenting)
(property sold at foreclosure does not bring best price but will bring fair consideration), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Alsop v. State (In re Alsop), 14 B.R. 982, 987
(Bankr. D. Alaska 1981) (failure to permit price received at foreclosure sale to signifi-

cantly drop below market value would chill participation at sale); Grand Trust Bank
v. Castle Apartments Inc., 379 A.2d 1144, 1145 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977) (price received
at foreclosure sale is based on percentage of fair market value); American Mechanical
Corp. v. Union Mach. Co. of Lynn, 485 N.E.2d 680 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (amount
received at mortgage foreclosure sale may be less than fair market value); Murphy v.
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estate, fair market value is often difficult to predict because of the
intrinsically complicated computation process. 29 Consequently,
establishing a foreclosure process predicated on fair market value
of property is unrealistic. 3 0 The proposed amendment, therefore,
is designed to minimize the problems created by the absence of a
definitive fair market value by attracting the greatest number of
bidders to foreclosure sales.3 1 Since the resultant highly populated foreclosure sale is the best available substitute for an open
market,3 2 compliance with the proposed statutory elements will
generate a market that will achieve optimal prices for real estate
under foreclosure while acting as a prophylactic, discouraging
courts from avoiding such sales as fraudulent transfers under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR STATUTORY ELEMENTs
Each of the proposed elements is advanced in light of a costbenefit analysis.3 3 In evaluating whether reasonably equivalent
value has been achieved, the suggested amendment strives to
shift the focus away from the monetary amount received at a foreFinancial Dev. Corp., 495 A.2d 1245, 1252 (N.H. 1985) (price received at foreclosure
sale may not be fair market value); see also Robert M. Washburn, The Judicialand
Legislative Response to PriceInadequacy in Mortgage ForeclosureSales, 53 S. CAL. L.
REV. 843, 848-49 (1980) (citing several reasons for low mortgage foreclosure prices).
29 See MICHAEL T. MADISON & ROBERT M. ZINMAN, MODERN REAL ESTATE FINANcING: A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 382-91 (1991). A number of methods may be used to
calculate the value of commercial property. See id. at 382. The "income method" has
become the primary method for valuing income producing real estate. Id. at 383-84.
The income method usually consists of dividing the net income of the property by a
selected capitalization rate, resulting in an estimate of value. Id. at 384. Since the net
income capitalization figures are themselves estimates, the reliability of the result
depends on the judgment used in selecting these factors. Id.
30 See id. If there is a high degree of uncertainty in computing fair market value
of commercial property, it follows that using a percentage of fair market value as a
basis for foreclosure value would be equally inaccurate.
31 See supranotes 24, 27-28 and accompanying text; infra notes 52-63, 68, 77 and
accompanying text.

32 See supranotes 24, 27-28 and accompanying text; infra notes 52-63, 68, 77 and
accompanying text.
33 See CHRISTINE AMMER & DEAN AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BusNss AND ECONOMICS 99 (1977). A cost-benefit analysis is "a systematic technique for... quantifying
and comparing the expected cost and benefit of each alternative and choosing the
option whose cost-benefit ratio is smallest." Id.; see Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or
Diversity: Residential Real Estate FinanceLaw in the 1990s and the Implications of
Changing FinancialMarkets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1288 (1991). Effective governmental regulation requires the benefits of such restrictions to exceed the costs. Id.
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closure sale and direct it3 towards
the procedure governing the
4
sale.
foreclosure
mortgage
In order to accomplish this goal, the statute is drafted in accordance with the general methodology proffered in the Brown v.
Vanguard
Holding Corp.3 and Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance
36
Co.

line of cases.3 7

Under this approach, a court examines

whether a noncollusive foreclosure sale was properly conducted
under state law. 38 If so, the totality of circumstances are evaluated, with particular emphasis on the enumerated statutory elements, to determine whether commercially reasonable steps were
taken to achieve the optimal price at the foreclosure sale. 9 Only
if the court determines that the foreclosure sale was not commercially reasonable, will it consider the value received at the foreclosure sale.4 °
A

Procedural Considerations

The first element of the amendment utilizes language from
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA") definition of "reasonably equivalent value."4 ' The UFTA codifies prior judicial at34 See infra notes 41-88 and accompanying text.
35 119 B.R. 413, 415 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (adopting Lindsay approach).
36 98 B.R. 983, 989-91 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989) (setting forth new test for deter-

mining reasonably equivalent value under section 548 of Bankruptcy Code).
37 See Haider v. Haider (In re Haider), 126 B.R. 796, 799 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1991)
(utilizing Lindsay approach to ascertain reasonably equivalent value).
38 See Lindsay, 98 B.R. at 991.
39 See id.
40 Id.
41 UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1984) [hereinafter

UFTA]. Section 3(b) of the UFTA specifically defines reasonably equivalent value:
[A] person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, non-collusive foreclosure sale or execution or a power of sale for the acquisition or
disposition of the interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed
of trust or security agreement.

Id.
Eighteen states have adopted the UFTA in some form. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN.
§ 4-59-201 to -213 (Michie 1987); CAL. Civ. CODE § 3439.00-.12 (Deering 1984 Supp.
1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 726.101-.112 (West 1988); HAw. REv. STAT. § 651c-1 to -10
(1985); IDAHO CODE § 55-910 to -921 (1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3571-3582
(West 1988 Supp. 1993); MmNN. STAT. ANN. § 513.41-.51 (West 1990); NEv. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 112.140-.250 (Michie 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 545-A:1 to -A12 (1974 &
Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-02.1-01 to -10 (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§§ 112-123 (West 1987); OR. REv. STAT. § 95.200-.310 (1993); TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE
ANN. § 24.001-.013 (West 1987); WASH. REv. CODE § 19.40.011-.901 (1989); W. VA.
CODE § 40-1A-1 to -12 (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 242.01-.13 (West 1988).
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tempts to focus on the procedure of a foreclosure sale rather than
on the price received.4 2 States adopting the UFTA can avoid the
anomalous result of having a foreclosure sale comply with state
foreclosure requirements, but avoided as a fraudulent transfer for
failing to achieve reasonably equivalent value under federal law.a3
The codification of the UFTA definition of reasonably equivalent
value in the Federal Bankruptcy Code would provide similar
consistency.4
The first subdivision of the UFTA also requires that the entire foreclosure sale be commercially reasonable. 45 This requirement was designed to grant the judiciary considerable flexibility
in avoiding a sale when finding bad faith, unconscionability, or
any other significant inequity. 46 Courts, however, should exercise
restraint in vitiating sales that comply with either state law or a
multitude of recommendations within the proposed statute.47 The
amendment's objective is to provide foreclosing sellers with guide-

42 See generally Robert M. Zinman, Foreclosures as Fraudulent Transfers, in
REAL EsTATE & THE BANKRUpTcy CODE 1986, at 149 (PLI Real Estate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. N4-4467, 1986) (UFTA approach to determining reasonably equivalent value evolved from anti-Durrettcase law).
43 See generally Robert J. Rosenberg & Richard C. Bosse, Jr., Avoidance of Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers: Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, in ADVANCED
BANKRuPrcY WORKSHOP 1992, at 269 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. A4-4359, 1992) (setting forth differences between avoidability of
transactions under state and federal law).
44 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (UFTA definition of reasonably
equivalent value promotes consistency).
45 See U.C.C. § 9-504(1), 9-507(2) (1985). The proposed statute's commercially
reasonable requirement was adopted from the U.C.C. method of evaluating whether a
foreclosure sale may be avoided as a fraudulent transfer. See id. The relative success
of this requirement under the U.C.C. foreshadows similar results if such a requirement were to be codified in the Federal Bankruptcy Code.
46 See Security Sav. Bank, SLAv. Tranchitella, 592 A.2d 284, 287 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1991). Commercial reasonableness should be viewed as a flexible concept
based upon consideration of all relevant factors presented in each individual case. Id.
A debtor may not waive the right to a commercially reasonable sale of collateral. May
v. The Women's Bank, N.A_, 807 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Colo. 1991) (citing Bankruptcy
Code). The U.C.C. uses a broad rule to test a party's disposition of collateral, placing
the burden on the creditor to prove that every aspect of a sale was commercially reasonable, especially if the property sold is in a noncompetitive atmosphere. Gulf
Homes, Inc. v. Goubeaux, 602 P.2d 810, 812 (Alaska 1979). See generally Northern
Commercial Co. v. Cobb, 778 P.2d 205, 210 (Alaska 1989) (stating Alaska statute allows secured party to release repossessed collateral in public or private sale as long as
requirement of commercial reasonableness is followed).
47 See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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lines for achieving reasonably equivalent value.48 If the court
abuses its power to avoid a sale for failing to be commercially reasonable, this eviscerates the statutory purpose. Flagrant avoidances will leave practitioners without any guidance. 4 9 Conversely, courts should not hesitate to exercise their power of
avoidance to prevent sellers who, although complying with state
law, are able to circumvent the purposes of the statute.5
The commercial reasonableness requirement also permits
courts to consider compliance with state foreclosure requirements
in determining whether reasonably equivalent value has been received.5 ' This enables mortgagees to use compliance with state
foreclosure proceedings as evidence of commercial reasonableness,
52
to which a bankruptcy judge is compelled to give some weight.

48 See supra notes 1-17 and accompanying text (describing anomaly which produces need for uniformity).
49 See C.I.T. Corp. v. Lee Pontiac, Inc., 513 F.2d 207, 209-10 (9th Cir. 1975). The
term "commercially reasonable" is not specifically defined in the U.C.C. Id. at 209.
The draftsmen deferred to case law for the development of its meaning. Id. Since the
U.C.C. does not define the term, the determination that a sale is commercially reasonable depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Westgate State Bank v.
Clark, 642 P.2d 961, 969 (Kan. 1982). Thus, it is submitted that flagrant avoidance of
foreclosure sales for failing to be commercially reasonable will not provide practitioners with any guidance and would be contrary to the purpose of the proposed statute.
50 See Cramton v. Altus Bank, 596 So. 2d 902, 905-06 (Ala. 1992). Under the
U.C.C., a disposition pursuant to a foreclosure sale which is approved in a judicial
proceeding is conclusively presumed commercially reasonable. Id. This result is
deemed equitable because all interested parties are given a chance to express their
objections to the sale during the proceedings. Id.
51 Cf supra note 5. In jurisdictions adopting the Durrett approach to reasonably
equivalent value, compliance with state foreclosure proceedings will have no bearing
on whether reasonably equivalent value was received. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l
Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980). The unique concern will be whether the
70% threshold has been met. Id. Additionally, although the other judicial approaches
authorize courts to look at facts and circumstances surrounding the sale, state foreclosure procedures are not a factor in the determination. See supra note 5.
52 See Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. Incendy, 540 A.2d 32, 39 (Conn.
1988). Evidence showing that a sale of collateral was conducted in a commercially
reasonable manner generally requires proof of such things as amount of advertising
done; number of people contacted; normal commercial practices of disposing of collateral; length of time before disposition and sale; deterioration of the property; bids
received; and price obtained. Id. Thus, the evaluation entails an examination of normal commercial practices. See id. Therefore, it is suggested that inclusion of the commercially reasonable requirement in the Federal Bankruptcy Code will correspondingly encourage examination of state foreclosure procedures to determine normal
commercial practices in that state.
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Price Considerationsand JudicialApproval

The second part of the statute is significant because it eliminates price from primary consideration in gauging reasonably
equivalent value. 3 The court will evaluate the consideration received only if it finds the procedure used by the mortgagee to be
commercially unreasonable. 4
This provision also bestows an irrebuttable presumption of
commercial reasonableness on foreclosure sales which have received judicial approval.5 5 This presumption expedites the process and promotes judicial economy by discouraging plaintiffs
from challenging such sales. 5 6 Sometimes, however, court approval is not expressly granted at the commencement of the sale,
as in the nonjudicial foreclosure states.57 For these situations,
the amendment provides several factors a court may consider in
determining whether the sale is commercially reasonable.5 An
explanation of each of these factors follows.
1.

Notice of Foreclosure

Subsection 2(A) of the proposed amendment authorizes judicial scrutiny of a mortgagee's efforts to provide notice to those of
53 A number of courts currently relegate price to a secondary consideration in
determining reasonably equivalent value. See, e.g., Littleton v. Littleton (In re Littleton), 888 F.2d 90, 93 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding percentage rule to be useful not
exclusive guideline for determination of reasonably equivalent value); Bundles v.
Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824-25 (7th Cir. 1988) (refusing to allow irrebuttable presumption of reasonably equivalent value based on price); McKeever v. McClandon (In re McKeever), 132 B.R. 996, 1008 (N.D. Il. 1991) (disallowing conclusive
presumption value given at foreclosure sale was reasonably equivalent).
54 See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (outlining various approaches to
reasonably equivalent value as related to commercial reasonableness).
55 See Cramton v. Altus Bank, 596 So. 2d 902, 905 (Ala. 1992) ("Where the disposition of the collateral has been approved in a judicial proceeding, the disposition is
conclusively deemed to be commercially reasonable."). Bestowing an irrebuttable presumption on a judicially approved foreclosure sale will have the result of forcing those
opposing the sale to raise their objections at the judicial proceeding. Id.; see supra
notes 49-53.
56 See infra notes 57-89 and accompanying text.
57 See MADISON & ZINA, supra note 29, at 1003-04, 1009 (discussing two primary methods of foreclosures: judicial and power of sale foreclosure).
58 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text; infra notes 59-63, 67-68 and
accompanying text. Subsection 2 of the proposed amendment was modeled in part
after U.C.C. § 9-504(3), which states in pertinent part: "[Elvery aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms of the must be commercially reasonable." U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1985). These considerations, however, are not
intended to be exclusive.
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record who have an interest in the property.5 9 The dissemination
of information can be accomplished at minimal cost to the seller. 60
Moreover, such judicial examination is likely to encourage diligent
disclosure. 6 1 Additionally, people with interests junior to the foreclosing mortgagee, who usually have a significant stake in the outcome of the foreclosure sale, will be apprised. 6 2 Consequently,
these parties are likely to act as watchdogs, overseeing the transaction and bringing procedural deficiencies to the attention of the
court.63 This threat of multiple scrutiny provides additional assurance that the foreclosure process is properly conducted. 64 As a
result, subsection 2(A) serves to increase the probability of a
higher price being received at the foreclosure sale.6 5

59 Numerous state foreclosure proceedings require notice to those with an interest in the foreclosed property. See, e.g., AmZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-809(B) (1990) (requiring notice of foreclosure sale by mail to those with recorded interest); MD. REAL.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 7-1052(1) (1992) (mandating written notice by certified mail to
record owner); MICH. AnrtuN. CODE r. 600.3208 (1977) (allowing owner to receive notice by publication similar to potential purchasers at foreclosure sale); TEX. ADmni.
CODE tit. Property, § 51.0002(b)(3) (1993) (stating holder of debt is to receive notice of
foreclosure sale by certified mail).
60 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Maximum cost in most cases
amounts to the price of a certified or registered letter to all persons who have a recorded interest in the property. Id. In the aggregate, this cost is minimal compared to
the amount at stake in a mortgage foreclosure sale.
61 A state foreclosure law mandating specific notification to those with an interest
in the property will probably already satisfy the disclosure requirements. See supra
note 59; infra note 68. If a state does not have such a requirement of specific notification, examining the reasonableness of notification will encourage a more diligent disclosure by foreclosing mortgagees. See supra note 59.
62 See Breeding Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 172 F.2d
416, 422 (10th Cir.) (function of notice is to attract interested bidders to mortgage
foreclosure sale and inform public), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 814 (1949); Cromer v.
DeJarnette, 51 S.E.2d 201, 204-07 (1949) (Miller, J., dissenting) (purpose of proper
foreclosure notification is to disseminate information about sale to all interested potential bidders).
63 See Cromer, 51 S.E.2d at 204-05 (Miller, J., dissenting). Whether notice is
proper "is to be determined and measured by consideration of the local custom...
relative to the manner in which similar sales are advertised, the results obtained, and
any other circumstances tending to establish the ultimate effectiveness of the [noticegiver's] actions." Id.
64 Moreover, it is submitted that creditors at significant risk, such as those who
have a lien junior to the foreclosing mortgagee, are likely to scrutinize the process and
alert the court if any material departure from proper procedure occurs.
65 It is submitted that mortgagees who are fearful that deviation from the proper
foreclosure process will be reported to the court are more likely to comply with the
appropriate state foreclosure procedures.
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2. Informing the Public
Another factor to be considered in determining commercial
reasonableness is the extent to which the public is informed of the
foreclosure sale.66 Subsection 2(B) mandates publication of notice
in a newspaper of general circulation.67 Currently, numerous
states utilizing a power-of-sale mortgage foreclosure process have
enacted similar provisions to enhance notification to potential bidders.68 This publication requirement will result in a minimal cost
increase to the mortgagee, since many states already require some
form of advertisement.69 Comparatively, the benefit to potential
buyers will be significant, since clearly delineated notice will enable buyers to readily locate the time and place of the auction in
which they are interested.7 0
Additionally, suggesting that courts examine the extent of
public notice achieved by a mortgagee's advertisement will encourage foreclosing sellers to publicize in a manner more easily
understood by laypersons. 71 Foreclosing sellers may effectively
accomplish this task by including a common description of the
See infra notes 67-68, 71-74 (discussing public notification).
Specifications as to which newspapers are considered of general circulation
may be established legislatively by the states or judicially by the court presiding over
a given case. See infra note 68. Even if the tenets are not unequivocally set forth in
the proposed statute, once a state defines the concept either legislatively or judicially,
it is submitted that subsequent cases in the jurisdiction will be provided with the
necessary illustrative guidance.
68 See Fishman, supra note 11, at 48-49 (terms of sale may be established by
court decrees or state statutes and rules, or both); see, e.g., AIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33808(1)(a) (1970 & Supp. 1993) (requiring notice published in newspaper of general
circulation at least weekly for four consecutive weeks prior to sale); FLA. STAT. ch.
45.031(1) (1993) (requiring publication of sale for two weeks in publication of general
circulation); MICH. ADmiN. CODE r. 600.3208 (1987) (notice of foreclosure sale mandated by publication weekly for four consecutive weeks); TEX. ADMiN. CODE tit. Property, § 51.002(b)(1), (2) (1993) (notice given to general public by combination of posting on courthouse door and filing with county clerk).
Additionally, states adopting judicial foreclosure will normally require court approval of the method utilized to satisfy the sale. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-25
(1993) (permitting court to specify nature and extent of advertising in judicial foreclosure sale); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1503 (1992) (allowing court to specify
nature of advertising requirements).
69 See supra note 68 and accompanying text; infra note 74 and accompanying
text.
70 See supra notes 59-63, 68 and accompanying text; infra notes 73, 76-78 and
accompanying text.
71 It is suggested that foreclosing sellers who are aware that courts are scrutinizing the notification given to potential buyers are more likely to clearly disclose the
sale to obtain judicial approval.
66
67

19931

REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE

property, such as a street address, in the notice. 7 2 This simple,
yet specific type of notice would cultivate public interest in bidding on the foreclosed property. 73 Furthermore, providing such a
description would enable even the unsophisticated public to easily
ascertain which property is being sold and would facilitate further
investigation of the sale.7 4
3.

Provision of Title Report

A third factor to aid the court in determining whether the
standard of commercial reasonableness was met is set forth in
subsection 2(C), 7 5 which would authorize court investigation into
whether a title report was provided to prospective purchasers at
the mortgage foreclosure sale. A comprehensive title report is indispensable to a potential buyer because it reveals many of the
risks inherent in the property.7 6 Such disclosure will result in less
buyer uncertainty, thereby providing higher bids and a greater
likelihood that reasonably equivalent value will be received in a
commercially reasonable sale.7 7 Moreover, in most situations,
providing a title report will result in minimal incremental cost to
72 See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-808(4)(C)(1) (1990 & Supp. 1993). Arizona currently requires that a common description accompany the legal description in publications giving notice of the sale. See id.
73 See 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 724(c)(2), at 1318 (1949) (identifying property with
"common certainty" usually suffices) (footnote omitted).
74 See Wesley J. Liebeler, A Property Rights Approach to JudicialDecisionMaking, in EcoNomc LiBERTMS AND THE JUDICIARY 153, 155 (James A. Dorn & Henry G.
Manne eds., 1987). When the costs of a transaction are high, courts should base their
decisions on behavior that the parties to the transaction themselves would have likely
undertaken. See id. In the context of mortgage foreclosure advertising, providing a
common description of the property would help to achieve the most efficient result.
See id. at 154-55.
75 See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
76 See Susan R. Boyle, Title Insurer Has No Duty to Report Cloud, MAss. L.
WKLY., May 18, 1992, at 1 (title insurer not liable for failure to disclose encumbrance
without contractual obligation to uncover and report title defects); Richard M. Frome
& Thomas D. Kearns, There Oughta Be a Law, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 31, 1991, at 2 (tenants
can request representation in certain situations from landlords, but absent title report, defects may only be disclosed upon foreclosure sale). Title insurance is also necessary to protect against defects disclosed by title report. See Tom Kelly, Unkempt
Yard May be Tip-Off to Crooks, SEATTLE TomEs, May 3, 1992, at G1 (indicating that
parties to private real estate purchase should obtain title report and title insurance so
that risks can be avoided). See generallyScott E. Mollen, Realty Law Digest, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 18, 1992, at 4 (stating that although title report did not disclose filing statement,
no protection provided because title insurance was not obtained).
77 See MADisoN & ZnmLA, supranote 29, at 240-54 (explaining benefits and risks
disclosed by title report through use of hypothetical example).

976

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:959

mortgagees since many are either required by state law to perform title searches7" or opt to do so for their own pecuniary
benefit.7 9
4.

Efficiency of Foreclosure Process

Another important consideration is the efficiency of the foreclosure process.8 0 While some states provide an expedient mechanism for disposing of foreclosure property, this expediency may result in an inequitable deprivation of a mortgagor's rights.8 1
Subsection 2(D) was codified to encourage a court to consider the
length of time given to a mortgagor to exercise the equity of redemption.8 2 This represents a last chance for the mortgagor, or
other parties whose interest would be relinquished at the foreclosure, to pay the lender after acceleration of the mortgage payments but before foreclosure. 83 In addition to equitable redempIf foreclosing sellers provide prospective purchasers with updated title reports,
the buyer will be informed of all risks that title reports could disclose as of the date of
the document, barring errors.
78 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 15-1506(f)(12) (Smith-Hurd 1992) (requiring
that title insurance be provided for purchaser at foreclosure sale).
79 Title reports and insurance are strongly suggested before foreclosure to ascertain all parties whose interests will be foreclosed and to whom notice of the foreclosure proceeding must be given. 2 DUNAwAY, supra note 3, § 27B.04[1](a). Mortgagees
electing to obtain updated title reports and insurance must carefully examine the exceptions to their policies. See generally id. § 27B.02[2][d]-[e].
80 See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing pros and cons of
timely foreclosure process).
81 See, e.g., TEx. PROP. CODE. ANN. § 51.002 (West Supp. 1994). See generally Alan
S. Gover & Glenn D. West, The Texas NonjudicialForeclosureProcess-A Proposalto
Reconcile the Procedures Mandated By State Law with the Fraudulent Conveyance
Principlesof the Bankruptcy Code, 43 Sw. L.J. 1061, 1065 (1990) (noting that Texas
mortgage foreclosure proceeding is both simple and efficient). But see Purnell v. Follett, 555 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (criticizing Texas state mortgage foreclosure proceeding as unduly harsh remedy). For a description of the modem Texas
foreclosure proceeding, see Gover & West, supra, at 1065-66.
82 See, e.g., In re Smail, 129 B.R. 676 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (demonstrating that
once equity of redemption period expires, mortgagor has no other remedy); see also
Bankruptcy: Chapter 13, 58 U.S.L.W. 2465, (Feb. 20, 1990) (explaining that policy
behind equitable redemption is question of how much time debtors should be given to
save their property); Foreclosure,52 U.S.L.W. 2171 (Sept. 27, 1983) (stating Washington law enables debtor to redeem within year of foreclosure sale); Washburn, supra
note 28, at 929 (asserting that equity of redemption is of particular importance when
property's value exceeds amount owed).
83 1 DUNAwAY, supra note 3, § 15.0112]. The equity of redemption enables the
mortgagor to retain the property by paying the default amount and other costs prior
to foreclosure. See id. § 15.06[1]. Some states have codified this right or guarantee a
minimum time in which to exercise it. See, e.g., CAL. Cr. CODE § 2924(c) (West 1993)
(requiring three month period from filing notice of default to notice of sale); GA. CODE
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tion, many states permit redemption for a specified period after
the foreclosure.8 4 The mortgagor's ability to exercise this statutory right varies from thirty days to three years. 85 An expanded
length of time for a mortgagor to exercise the equity of redemption
or statutory redemption rights increases the probability that the
sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner;8 6 however, an expanded duration of this right subjects the foreclosing
seller to financial risks."' Consequently, courts considering this
provision must exercise caution in evaluating the costs and benefits to those in the foreclosure process. 88

ANN. § 67-115 (Supp. 1993) (terminating equity of redemption after ten years of mortgagee's last recognition of redemption right if borrower permits lender to take possession of property); Idaho Code § 45-1506(12) (Supp. 1993) (permitting cure for 115 days
after notice of default or until foreclosure decree); IND. CODE § 32-8-16-1 sec. 1(a)
(West Supp. 1993) (decree of sale under judicial foreclosure delayed for three, six, or
twelve months after filing of complaint, depending on date of mortgage execution).
84 1 DUNAWAY, supra note 3, § 15.01[1],[3]. Statutory redemption, which involves

payment of the sale price rather than the default amount, exists in approximately
half of the states. Id. § 15.01[3].
85 1 DUNAWAY, supra note 3, § 15.04; see, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. §§ 09.35.220(2),
09.35.250 (1983) (enabling debtor and lenders with possibility of losing interest in
property through foreclosure to redeem prior to sale or within 12 months thereafter);
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1281, 12-1282 (1992) (judgment debtor or successors may
redeem property up to 30 days after foreclosure sale, subject to limited exceptions);
ARm. CODE ANN. § 18-49-106 (Michie 1987) (property sold under order of decree can be
redeemed up to one year from time of sale); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-39-102 (1993)

(borrower or any other person liable for deficiency has 75-day redemption period following sale); IDHO CODE § 11-402 (1990) (allowing redemption within one year of
foreclosure if land is more than twenty acres or within six months if land is twenty
acres or less).
86 See Washburn, supra note 28, at 930 (reasoning that longer redemption periods provide borrowers with additional time to finance repurchase).
87 The lender bears the risk that the property will decline in value prior to sale,
yielding insufficient proceeds to satisfy the underlying debt. 1 DUNAwAY, supra note
3, § 6.02, at 6-2. The lender may incur costs in maintaining the property prior to foreclosure in an attempt to preserve the value. See id. Additionally, in states permitting
redemption after the foreclosure sale, the sale price will be diminished because the
purchaser bears the risk that if the mortgagor exercises the right of redemption he
will have to relinquish the property. See id. § 15.01[3].
88 See Michael H. Schill, An EconomicAnalysis of MortgagorProtectionLaws, 77
VA. L. REv. 489, 490 (1991) (analyzing economic efficiency of mortgagor protection
laws). See generally 27 Am. JuR. 2D Equity § 192 (1966) (demonstrating courts may
consider expense and complexity of proceedings when deciding whether to avoid multifarious suit); 75A Am. Jun. 2D Trial § 612 (1991) (stating arguments to jury based on
economic theory or factors may be valid).
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C. Price Analysis of Commercially UnreasonableForeclosure
Sales
Section 3, the last portion of the statute, authorizes scrutiny
of the price received at a foreclosure sale only if a court previously
concluded that the sale was not conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.8 9 In this instance, the foreclosing seller is
stripped of the protection afforded by a properly conducted sale90
as the court is determining whether to avoid the transfer. 9 1 However, in evaluating the price received, it is imperative that the
92
consideration be measured pursuant to the foreclosure market
since the appraisal in a fair market does not adequately contemplate the risks inherent in the foreclosure process. 93 The possibility of obtaining a higher price, therefore, should not preclude a
89 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. For cases discussing commercial
reasonableness, see Leasing Serv. Corp. v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 826 F.2d
434, 439 (2d Cir. 1987) (interpreting commercial reasonableness as requiring creditor
to dispose of collateral in accordance with prevailing trade practices among responsible businesses involved in similar business); Suffield Bank v. LaRoche, 752 F. Supp.
54, 61 (D.R.I. 1990) (evaluating procedural aspects of sale in applying commercial
reasonableness requirement to disposition of property); Topeka Datsun Motor Co. v.
Stratton, 736 P.2d 82, 86 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987) (stating "commercial reasonableness is
an umbrella term which encompasses all aspects of sale"); Huntington Nat'l Bank. v.
Elkins, 559 N.E.2d 456, 458 (Ohio 1990) (price alone not determinative of commercial
reasonableness); Mount Vernon Dodge, Inc. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 570 P.2d 702,
711 (Wash. 1977) (stating commercial reasonableness focuses on methodology of sale,
not price).
90 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
91 See Lindsay, 98 B.R. at 991. If the foreclosure sale was not commercially reasonable, then the seller is in the vulnerable position of permitting the price received to
be considered in determining reasonably equivalent value. See id.
92 See, e.g., Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir.
1980) (holding that 57.7% of fair market value not reasonably equivalent); Berge v.
Sweet (In re Berge), 33 B.R. 642, 650 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983) (stating that 68.5% of
fair market value not reasonably equivalent where sale lacked procedural protections); Moore v. Gilmore (In re Gilmore), 31 B.R. 615, 617-18 (Bankr. E.D. Wash.
1983) (noting that while 63% to 76% of market value may not have been reasonably
equivalent value, fair price alone not decisive if fair procedures employed); Richard v.
Tempest (In re Richard), 26 B.R. 560, 563 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983) (holding that 1% of fair
market value not reasonably equivalent). See generally Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 95862 (providing reasons for differences between foreclosure value and fair market
value).
93 See Walcott, supra note 10, at 409-10 (explaining policy behind difference in
fair market value and foreclosure price); Zinman, supra note 6, at 594-601 (describing
reasons for difference between price of foreclosed commercial property and residential
property, and why Durrettapproach is inadequate to measure both); cf In re Ristich,
57 B.R. 568, 577 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (creating irrebuttable presumption that when
person unrelated to debtor purchases property at foreclosure sale, price received was
reasonably equivalent).
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finding that reasonably equivalent value was received;9 4 rather,
the figure must be evaluated in light of the circumstances of each
95

case.

D.

Interest of All Partiesin ObtainingHigher Price at the
ForeclosureSale

All of the parties involved in a foreclosure proceeding are best
served by eliciting the optimal price at the sale.9 6 The lower the
consideration received at the sale, the greater the probability that
the sale will be avoided by a court for failing to achieve reasonably
equivalent value. Mortgagees are often the highest bidders and
will often purchase the property themselves for approximately the
Consequently, the
amount of the outstanding encumbrance.
property must be further processed, improved, or resold before the
lenders can recover.98 Most prudent lenders are not in the real
estate business and would prefer to realize their investment at the
foreclosure sale rather than at a subsequent sale.9 9 Additionally,
94 See U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (1985). "e fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a different method from that selected by the
secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a
commercially reasonable manner." Id.; see MacDonald v. First Interstate Credit Alliance, Inc. (In re MacDonald), 100 B.R. 714, 717-18 (Bankr. D. Del. 1989) (fact that
better sale price was available not grounds to set aside foreclosure sale for commercial
unreasonableness); McMillian v. Bank South, NA., 373 S.E.2d 61, 63 (Ga. Ct. App.
1988) (availability of better price alone does not warrant avoidance of sale); Villella
Enter., Inc. v. Young, 766 P.2d 293, 296-97 (N.M. 1988) (noting that while price is
relevant, merely claiming that price is too low does not rebut presumption of commercial reasonableness); State Natl Bank v. Academia Inc., 802 S.W.2d 282, 289 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1990) (adequacy of price, though not dispositive, is "key component" in assessing
commercial reasonableness).
95 See also MacDonald,100 B.R. at 718 (examining facts of particular sale to determine whether commercially reasonable).
96 See supranotes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing cyclical problem that
results if insufficient consideration is received at mortgage foreclosure sale resulting
in judicial avoidance of sale).
97 See 2 DUNAWAY, supra note 3, § 27B.04[21[b][i] (mortgagees often purchase
foreclosed property at foreclosure sale); Ehrlich, supra note 6, at 961 (mortgagees
often acquire foreclosed property for approximately amount of outstanding encumbrance); Robert K. Lifton, Real Estate in Trouble: Lender's Remedies Need an Overhaul, 31 Bus. LAw. 1927, 1937 (1976) (indicating that mortgagee is only bidder in
approximately 99% of public foreclosure sales).
98 See infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text (indicating problems lender
faces by reacquiring foreclosed property at mortgage foreclosure sale, in particular,
costs of resale such as advertising).
99 See 4 DUNAWAY, supra note 3, TX 6.09 (demonstrating necessity of mortgagee
to resell property purchased at foreclosure sale to obtain ultimate return); see also
Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass:ForeclosureBy Sale as De Facto Strict
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foreclosures in which the mortgagee is the final purchaser are
likely to be the subject of heightened scrutiny because the process
appears to be a procedural formality without economic substance. 100 Owners of foreclosed property also have a vested interest in maximizing the proceeds of a foreclosure sale. A higher
price reduces the likelihood of a deficiency judgment and augments the possibility of a surplus, which would be returned to the
original owner. 1 1
III. A

PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO ACHIEVING REASONABLY

EQUIVALENT VALUE

A.

Suggestions for Realizing Reasonably Equivalent Value
Absent a statutory amendment to section 548 of the Federal
Bankruptcy Code defining reasonably equivalent value in the context of mortgage foreclosures, practitioners desperately need a
framework to assist them in achieving this ethereal goal. 0 2 The
following discussion includes a series of suggestions an attorney
may use to bolster his claim in attempting to convince a court that
reasonably equivalent value was received. The practitioner may
view the proposals as a type of self-insurance system. 0 3 Admit-

Foreclosure-AnEmpiricalStudy of Mortgage Foreclosureand Subsequent Resale, 70
CORNELL L. REv. 850, 875 (1985) (mortgagees repurchased property in 91 of 118 foreclosure sales necessitating resale before mortgagees could ultimately recapture their
investment).
100 See Washburn, supra note 28, at 887 (noting higher scrutiny given to mortgagee-purchaser).
101 See In re Francis, 42 B.R. 760, 762 (Bankr. S.D. Mo. 1984) (noting debtors'
desire to obtain maximum price at foreclosure sale to reduce amount of deficiency
judgment); Court Won't Review if Ch. 7 DebtorCan Redeem Realty for 'StrippedDown'
Value, 57 Bankr. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 864 (Nov. 25, 1991) (stating purpose of statute
to protect Wisconsin debtors from deficiency judgments); ForeclosureSale is Set Aside
for Mistake, InadequatePrice;Crossland Mort. Corp. v. Frankel, Supreme Court, Justice Letkowitz, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 21, 1992, at 21, 27 (foreclosure sales will be vacated
where inequitable); Real Property Law SurreptitiousLease Changes;Northern Metropolitan Residential Health Care Facility Inc. v. Ledri Realty Assoc. Inc., N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 21, 1992, at 21, 23 (property sold subject to lease in bankruptcy proceeding increases deficiency judgment); Tight FHA Underwriting Stds. and CreditAnalyses are
Planned to Curb Abuses, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. 66, at A-1 (Apr. 7, 1986)
(HUD aggressively pursues deficiency judgments against program abusers).
102 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text (explaining why practitioners
need some guidance until adequate legislative remedy is provided).
103 See GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND PoVERTY 113 (1981) (asserting that people
obtain insurance to remove risk from unknown future). But see Syracuse Eng'g Co. v.
Haight, 110 F.2d 468, 471 (2d Cir. 1940) (noting that self-insurance is no insurance at
all); In re New York State Rys., 16 F. Supp. 717, 724 (N.D.N.Y 1936) (determining
that debtor was self-insurer by saving money himself); BLAcies LAw DiCTioNARY 724
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tedly, costs will be increased as additional steps are taken, but it
is submitted that the risk of avoidance of the foreclosure sale will
correspondingly be reduced.' °4
One important factor for practitioners to consider is advertising. 0 5 Promotion of the sale increases the number of prospective
buyers, 10 6 thereby heightening the probability that reasonably
equivalent value will be received. The effects of advertising can be
enhanced by increasing the frequency of publication beyond the
requirements of state law. 10 7 Additionally, the client may consider advertising the sale in real estate sections of local newspapers and other magazines specializing in the particular type of
real estate being marketed. Since the cost of advertising may out(6th ed. 1990) (defining self-insurance plan as plan where insured periodically places
aside money in fund to cover potential future losses).
104 See Mark N. Polebaum et al., Completed ForeclosurePreferencesand Fraudulent Transfers, C784 ALI-ABA 411 (1992). A foreclosing seller is more likely to protect
himself by following a more diligent procedure. Id.
105 See, e.g., Britta Gordon, Sale of High-End Homes Sluggish in Recent Months,
PORTLAND Bus. J., Oct. 5, 1992, § 1, at 19 (finding high cost of realty advertising
squeezes medium-sized brokers out of market); Adrienne Hardman, Under the Gavel,
FIN. WoRLD, Sept. 29, 1992, at 28 (noting that auctioneers charge per-property entry
fee to cover cost of advertising); Rose Ragsdale, Realtors Will Publish Weekly Advertiser, ALAsKA J. COM., July 20, 1992, at 1 (discussing special publication to advertise
real estate to combat rising costs); Real Estate,HigherAppraisal Threshold Needed
for Commercial Real Estate, ABA Claims, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) 129 (July 6,
1992) (noting commercial real estate costs have risen sharply last year); Regulation
Raising Commercial Appraisal Costs-ABA, Reuters Ltd., July 6, 1992, at 1 (finding
rise in real estate appraisal costs in past year by average of 48%); After Merger, Former Competitors Gird for New Rivals in Residential Real Estate, PORTLAND Bus. J.,
June 29, 1992, § 1, at 5 (discussing how two of Portland's largest residential real estate firms joined forces, in part to cut advertising costs).
106 See Jamie Beckett, Advertisers Use Recession to Their Advantage, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 27, 1992, at B3 (discussing advertisers' creation of new approaches to
increase sales in recession); Jamie Beckett, Madison Avenue to Run Ad Asking President for Plug, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 23, 1992, at B1 (advertising offers numerous economic benefits such as stimulating sales, reducing consumer pricing, and increasing
product innovation); Mark Larson, Media Nervously View Advertising Revenues, SACRAmENTO Bus. J., Jan. 6, 1992, at 10 (advertisers can encourage advertising sales by
lowering prices); Phil Rabin & Carolyn Myles, Coast Guard Deal Afloat Finalists
Ready to Protest, WASH. TmEs, Dec. 23, 1992, at C3 (finding advertising beneficial
when consumers are optimistic); see also Timothy McQuiston, Where Do Banks Go
FromHere?, 20 VT. Bus. MAG. 22 (1992) (explaining banks benefit from strong promotion and advertising that generate clientele at foreclosure sales); Steven Wolcott, New
Network Offers Services for ResidentialReal Estate Brokers in KC, 10 KAN. CrrY Bus.
J. (1992) (small real estate agents syndicating to take advantage of advertising).
107 See supra notes 105-06 (more frequent advertising increases probability that
interested bidders are adequately informed of sale).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:959

weigh its benefits, however, a case-by-case or portfolio-by-portfolio
analysis will be required.'
The foreclosing seller should also consider soliciting the
assistance and cooperation of the debtor.'0 9 Since each party has
a vested interest in maximizing the consideration received at the
foreclosure sale, both parties may be amenable to an agreement
allowing prospective purchasers to examine the property."10 Inspection will decrease the unknown variables inherent in the foreclosure process. This risk reduction should serve to increase the
price buyers are willing to pay.I"
Another suggestion, also of insignificant expense to foreclosing mortgagees, is to increase the number of days of advance no-2
tice by one week beyond the minimum prescribed by state law."1
Extending the notice requirement will demonstrate to a court
scrutinizing the foreclosure process that the mortgagee clearly
provided the community with sufficient time to learn of and make
relevant inquiries into the sale.
Mortgagees should also assess the feasibility of obtaining an
appraisal of the foreclosed property."13 The property should be
See generally Peter F. Koslowski, The Ethics of Capitalism,in PmILosopmcAL
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 33, 35 (Svetozar Pejovich ed., 1983) (explaining that people in all economies evaluate alternatives in striving to maximize
profit).
109 See Daniel J. Isenberg, Tangible Personal Property (Owner Financing), 339
PLI/Comn 81 (1984) (providing suggestions for attorneys seeking to protect foreclosure sales involving personal property from avoidance under section 548). These recommendations will also be useful for practitioners attempting to accomplish the same
goal involving mortgage foreclosure sales. See Mark N. Polebaum et al., Completed
Foreclosures, Preferences, and Fraudulent Transfers, C784 ALI-ABA 411 (containing
suggestions specifically designed to assist counsel in preventing mortgage foreclosure
sale from being avoided).
110 See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text (stating each party's interest
in receiving best price).
1l See supra note 17 and accompanying text (proposing that removing risk from
foreclosure process should serve to increase price received at foreclosure sale).
112 The author recognizes that extending the notification requirement by one
week is arbitrary. However, the mortgagee must choose a time that provides adequate
notice while minimizing the cost of the extended notification. It is suggested that one
week would suffice.
113 See generallyAppraisals:The Cost of a FaultyAppraisal,22 RFAL EST. L. REP.
7 (1992) (explaining nightmare scenario to frighten residential appraisers and their
insurance carriers); James M. Pedowitz, The Creditor'sRights Exclusion: Belt and
Suspenders, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TITLE INSURANCE: 1992, at 13 (PLI Real
Estate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. N4-4568, 1992) (explaining
foreclosure sale would not be attacked as fraudulent if proper underwriting practices,
including appraisals, were utilized); Polebaum et al., supra note 109, at 411 (discussing importance of appraisal).
108

AND
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evaluated in light of the hazards of the foreclosure market."14
Although a foreclosure price may be difficult to predict, the appraisal may be used as a benchmark in establishing that reasonably equivalent value was received."15 Additionally, the lender
may use the appraisal as evidence of the property's value as deter6
mined by an independent party not involved in the transaction."1
Furthermore, mortgagees should avoid unreasonable postponement of the sale"17 since any delay may diminish interest cultivated by prior advertisement."' 8 If unavoidable impediments
arise, re-advertisement is invaluable to maintain interest and ed114 See generally James W. Hubbel, Defending Lender Liability Suits, 19 CoLO.
LAw. 2409 (1990) (providing series of indicators which should serve to warn lender's
counsel of potential problems, including substantial deficiency bid unsupported by appraisal); Richard W. Havel et al., Materials on ForeclosureLitigation, 0740 ALI-ABA
97 (1992) (discussing mortgage foreclosure appraisal statutes).
115 See Noel W. Nellis et al., Issues and StrategiesForDealingWith a Real Estate
Workout, R175 ALI-ABA, BANKR. 139 (1992) (stating lender should obtain independent appraisal which will carry more weight in convincing court of foreclosure value).
See generally2 DUNAWAY, supra note 3, § 25.03. In jurisdictions following the Durrett
approach, the lender should be sure to have the appraisal made prior to the foreclosure sale and bid at least 70% of the property's fair market value. Id. The lender's
appraisal should be evaluated to determine whether foreclosure is prudent in light of
the extensive time and expense involved in the foreclosure of real estate. Id.
116 See generally 2 DUNAWAY, supra note 3, § 27D.01-.08 (indicating sales where
foreclosing mortgagees reacquired property were more likely to be scrutinized).
Fraud and incompetence in the appraisal profession run rampant and were the
subject of a 1987 congressional subcommittee hearing. Id. § 27D.01. One of the reasons why appraisers are able to avoid litigation is that most do not have deep pockets.
Id. § 27D.04[1]. Numerous techniques of misrepresentation in the appraisal profession can be mentioned as criteria for fraud. Id. § 27D.05. One of the problems with the
contemporary appraisal profession is inadequate supervision and training. Id.
§ 27D.07.
117 See Paul E. Roberts, ConstructionLoan Documentation,Structure and Procedure for Troubled Times, C788 ALI-ABA 43 (1992) (stating delays inherent in foreclosures make cumbersome procedure more awkward and expensive); Myron C. Weinstein, Sheriffs Need Help With Foreclosure Crisis, N.J. L.J., Jan 18, 1993, at C3
(finding delays increase foreclosure costs to lender and undue delays hurt everyone).
See generally Paul Feldman, PairWho Offered Phony Legal Aid Get Jail Terms, L.A.
TniEs, Aug. 21, 1985, at 2 (discussing fraudulent offer by people to halt or delay foreclosure and eviction); Wendy Swallow, Bankruptcy Used to Stall Foreclosures,WASH.
PosT, Mar. 17, 1984, at El (noting changes in Bankruptcy Code allow debtors to delay
foreclosure process through bankruptcy).
118 See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (claiming any delay in process
should be accompanied by new advertising); see also Jo Anne Bradner, Note, The Secondary Mortgage Market and State Regulation of Real Estate Financing,36 EmORY
L.J. 971, 997-1003 (1987) (explaining costs in mortgage foreclosure system are largely
function of delays). See generally George M. Platt, The DraculaMortgage; Creatureof
the Omitted JuniorLienholder, 67 OR. L. REv. 287 (1988) (discussing problems of defective foreclosure).
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ucate potential buyers."1 9 Foreclosing sellers should also employ
all other reasonable steps necessary to cultivate competitive bidding and increase the number of interested buyers at the sale, provided that the cost of utilizing such techniques are outweighed by
20
the benefits of increasing the public awareness of the sale.
Finally, mortgagees should obtain a foreclosure price that is
at least seventy percent of fair market value.' 21 Obtaining a price
in excess of this threshold will reduce court scrutiny in virtually
22
all jurisdictions.1
B.

Ramifications of Jurisdiction

Another important variable for practitioner evaluation is the
approach currently utilized in their jurisdiction for determining
reasonably equivalent value.1 2 3 A discussion of the methods most
commonly employed follows.
1.

The Durrett Approach

Under the approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Durrett v.
National Insurance Co., reasonably equivalent value is obtained
119 See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text (discussing advertising). See
generally Robin Phelan et al., "Dance With the One That Brought You" Unless it was a
Failed Savings and Loan Then You Have to do the Lambada With the Resolution
Trust Corporation,in ADVANCED BANKRuPTcY WORKSHOP 1991, at 317, 371 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4325, 1991) (explaining
attempts by borrowers that will fail to delay foreclosure sales).
120 See Eugene H. Berman & James H. Fierberg, Durrett: The Problem and Suggestions for its Solution, 90 COM. L.J. 162, 169 (1989) (noting modest investment of
time, money, and effort may protect avoidance of foreclosure sales).
121 See supra note 5 (discussing how foreclosure price in excess of 70% of fair
market value minimizes court scrutiny of foreclosure process).
122 See supra note 5. In jurisdictions adopting the Durrett approach, failure to
achieve a foreclosure sale price of at least 70% of the property's fair market value will
usually preclude the sale from being considered as having achieved reasonably
equivalent value. See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir.
1980). In a Madridjurisdiction, although price received at a noncollusive mortgage
foreclosure sale is irrebuttably presumed to be reasonably equivalent value, sales
achieving at least 70% of fair market value will receive a more superficial examination by a court. Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp. (In re Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197,
1201-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984). In states where the Bundles or
Lindsay approaches are followed, price is considered one of a number of factors; thus,
achieving a price in excess of 70% of fair market value will be advantageous. See
Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988); Lindsay, 98 B.R.
at 991.
123 See infra note 124-41 and accompanying text (discussing ramifications of different jurisdictional approaches to determining reasonably equivalent value and resulting action to be undertaken by practitioner).
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when at least seventy percent of the property's fair market value
has been received at the foreclosure sale.' 2 4 In a Durrettjurisdiction, attorneys must consider the type of property being sold.'2 5 If
the foreclosed property is residential real estate, evaluating the
26
fair market value of the property is relatively straightforward.
The safest approach is to ensure that the price received exceeds
seventy percent of the property's fair market value; 2 7 however,
the seventy percent Durrett rule is merely a benchmark, not a requirement. 28 Consequently, if seventy percent is not realized, a
colorable argument can be made that since each piece of land is
unique, the risks affiliated with each are different. 29 Therefore,
124 Durrett,621 F.2d at 205.
125 See Zinman, supra note 6, at 594-601 (urging distinction between commercial
and residential property in analyzingDurrettproblem); Michael L. Cook et al., Fraudulent Transfers, in BAsics OF BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION 1992, AT 9 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4391, 1992) (stating mortgage foreclosure sales were first subjected to reasonably equivalent value
requirement of section 548 under Durrett and progeny); J. Thomas Dunn, Jr., Representing a Secured Lender, in UNDERSTANDING BusnEss BANKRUpTcY 1992: How TO
HANDLE EVERYDAY PROBLEMS, at 55 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-4393, 1992) (noting Durrett first case to hold noncollusive foreclosure sale subject to § 548 reasonably equivalent value requirement); Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Meyer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, in FORIUATING
REORGANIZATION PLANS: STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESs, at 9, 9 (PLI Commercial Law Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4374, 1992) (Sandy Ride case antithesis of
Durrett).
126 See Zinman, supra note 6, at 599 (finding generally easy to estimate fair market value of residential real property).
127 See, e.g., Abramson v. Lakewood Bank and Trust Co. (In re Abramson), 647
F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming Durrettholding), cert. denied, 454 U.S 1164 (1982);
Barrett v. Commonwealth Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n (In re Barrett), 113 B.R. 175,
183 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (using Durrettapproach, 69.5% of fair market value not
reasonably equivalent value under Federal Bankruptcy Code), rev'd, 118 B.R. 255
(Bankr. E.D. Pa.), affd, 439 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1991); Aspedon v. Labbee (In re Aspedon), 73 B.R. 538, 540 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987) (applying Durrett70% benchmark to
determine reasonably equivalent value); Fargo Builtmore Motor Hotel Corp. v. Metropolitan Fed. Bank (In re Fargo Builtmore Motor Hotel Corp.), 49 B.R. 782, 789
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (payment of 70% of fair market value considered reasonably
equivalent value under Durretttest); Willis v. Borg-Warner (In re Willis), 48 B.R. 295,
301 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (applying Durretttest to determine reasonably equivalent
value); Coleman v. Home Sav. Ass'n (In re Coleman), 21 B.R. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1982) (concluding 28% of fair market value not reasonably equivalent value);
Wicksham v. United Am. Bank, (In re Thompson), 18 B.R. 67, 70 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1982) (finding 80.8% of fair market value reasonably equivalent value under Durrett
test).
M See Durrett, 621 F.2d at 205 (suggesting 70% benchmark, not mandating it).
129 Land is considered a unique asset as evidenced by a court's willingness to
grant specific performance in contracts involving land disputes. See, e.g., Canton v.
Monaco Partnership, 753 P.2d 158, 160 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (failing to award specific
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undertaking any of the foregoing suggestions may help reduce the
13 0
possibility of a fraudulent transfer.
Conversely, the fair market value of commercial property is
difficult to predict because of the complexity and uncertainty involved in the requisite actuarial computations. 13 Accordingly,
predicting seventy percent of an amorphous figure will be equally
difficult.' 32 Again, however, it is submitted that undertaking an
increased number of recommendations will heighten the
probability that reasonably equivalent value was received.
2.

The Madrid Approach

The Ninth Circuit's approach in Madrid v. Lawyer's Title Insurance Corp. creates an irrebuttable presumption of reasonably
equivalent value if the price was received at a noncollusive and
regularly-conducted foreclosure sale. 13 3 Thus, to establish that
reasonably equivalent value was received, practitioners in Madrid
they have strictly complied with
jurisdictions need only show that
34
proceedings.1
state foreclosure
3.

The Bundles Approach

Courts adopting the Seventh Circuit's approach in Bundles v.
Baker examine all of the facts and circumstances surrounding a
performance to condominium owner but stating remedy is common in land disputes);
Wolliamsky v. Miller, 661 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (stating specific performance ordinarily available for sale of real estate because land unique); C. Robert
Nattress & Assocs. v. Cidco, 229 Cal. Rptr. 33, 37 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (noting
specific performance usually given for breach of contract involving real property because land considered unique); 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfr., 485 A.2d 199
(D.C. 1984) (finding legal remedy of specific performance warranted where land involved because all land unique); see also Whig Syndicate, Inc. v. Keyes, 836 P.2d 1283,
1287 (Okla. 1992) (noting specific performance used in land disputes because land is
unique asset); GRW Enters., Inc. v. Davis, 797 S.W.2d 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)
(granting specific performance because land unique).
130 See supra notes 105-22 and accompanying text.
131 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining computation behind valuation of commercial real estate).
132 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.

133 See 21 B.R. 424, 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), affd on other grounds, 725 F.2d
1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
134 See Cardinal Enters. v. Far West Fed. Bank, 68 B.R. 460, 462 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1986) (following Madrid approach to determining reasonably equivalent value), affd,
844 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1988); Strauser v. Veterans Admin., 40 B.R. 868, 870 (N.D.
Ohio 1984) (holding properly conducted foreclosure sale is conclusively reasonably
equivalent value); Reinboldt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 39 B.R. 677 (Bankr. D. Minn.) (following Madrid approach to reasonably equivalent value), affd, 59 B.R. 678 (Bankr. D.
Minn 1984).
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foreclosure sale to determine whether reasonably equivalent value
was received. 13 5 The suggestions previously outlined will probably be most useful in this type of jurisdiction.13 6 A court examining the foreclosing seller's aggregate conduct will be increasingly
was received
likely to conclude that reasonably equivalent value
37
utilized.'
suggestions
of
number
the greater the
4. The Hybrid Approach
Finally, a strong case can also be made for using the foregoing
recommendations in states adopting a hybrid approach to determining reasonably equivalent value.' 38 An example of a hybrid
approach is set forth in the Lindsay decision.'3 9 Courts following
this methodology require strict compliance with state foreclosure
proceedings, followed by an examination of the totality of the circumstances involved in each particular case.' 40 Since the jurisdictions employing this technique consider a multitude of factors, an
the
increase in the number of suggestions undertaken will14reduce
1
possibility that a court will avoid the foreclosure sale.
IV.

REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE IN THE CONTEXT OF
MORTGAGE FoRECLOSUREs: A CoNTEMPoRARY IssUE

The problem of defining reasonably equivalent value in the
context of mortgage foreclosures has existed since the Durrett decision in 1980.142 Recently, however, in In re BFP, the United
135 See Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988).
136 See supra notes 105-22 and accompanying text.
137 See Barrett v. Commonwealth Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 939 F.2d 20, 22 (3d
Cir. 1991) (utilizing case-by-case approach to determine reasonably equivalent value);
Morris Communications NC, Inc. v. Ashley Communications, 914 F.2d 458, 466-67
(4th Cir. 1990) (adopting Bundles case-by-case approach); Lavender and McKeever v.
BMJ Co. (In re Lavender and McKeever), 132 B.R. 996, 1012 (Bankr. N.D. IlM. 1991)
(examining facts and circumstances of each particular case to determine reasonably
equivalent value); DeVito v. DeVito (In re DeVito), 111 B.R. 529, 532 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1990) (adopting Bundles approach).
138 Lindsay, 98 B.R. at 991.
139 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 35, 37 (setting forth recent cases adopting Lindsay approach).
141 See supra note 105-22 and accompanying text.
142 See Durrett,621 F.2d at 201 (analyzing reasonably equivalent value in mortgage foreclosure context); Brief of the American Counsel of Life Insurance and American College of Real Estate Attorneys as amici curiae in Support of Respondents, at 810, In re BFP, 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1992) (indicating no case prior to Durrett ever
invalidated regularly-conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale and Durrett contradicted more than 400 years of fraudulent conveyance law), cert. granted, In re BFP,
113 S. Ct. 2411 (1993) [hereinafter American Counsel of Life Ins. and ACREL Brief].
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States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of
whether reasonably equivalent value is received as a matter of
law pursuant to a regularly-conducted, noncollusive foreclosure
sale. 14 3 If this question is answered in the affirmative, the Court
will provide foreclosing sellers with the means to protect their
mortgage foreclosure sales from being avoided for failure to
achieve reasonably equivalent value.A However, regardless of
the Supreme Court's decision, the suggestions provided by the
145
proposed amendment will be useful.
But see Brief of Frank Allen, Lavander and Elnora McKeever, The Consumer Education and Protective Association, The Consumer's League of New Jersey and Chapter
13 Trustee Edward Sparkman as amici curiaein support of petitioner, at 13-27, In re
BFP, 974 F.2d at 1144 [hereinafter Consumer Educ. and Protective Ass'n Brief].
143 See In re BFP, 974 F.2d at 1144; American Counsel of Life Ins. and ACREL
Brief, supra note 142, at i (indicating question presented); Consumer Educ. and Protective Ass'n Brief, supra note 142, at 13-27 (arguing noncollusive, regularly-conducted mortgage foreclosure sale not permissible method of achieving reasonably
equivalent value); see also BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. 92-1370, NAr'L L.J., Aug. 23,
1993, at S22 (discussing noncollusive, regularly-conducted mortgage foreclosure sale
as permissible method for achieving reasonably equivalent value under Federal
Bankruptcy Code); BFP v. Imperial Sav. & Loan 92-1370, NATL L.J., June 7, 1993, at
38 (noting decision in 9th Circuit would be granted certiorari);Bankruptcy 92-1370,
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 61 U.S.L.W. 3783 (May 25, 1993) (commenting on
court's approach to determining reasonably equivalent value in BFP);92-1370, BFP v.
Imperial Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 61 U.S.L.W. 3695 (Apr. 6, 1993) (summarizing holding of
BFP); Marc A. Levinson, Consensus of Value is Elusive; ForeclosureSale, NAr'L L.J.,
Nov. 30, 1992, at 33 (indicating discrepancy among approaches to determining reasonably equivalent value under Federal Bankruptcy Code); Barry L. Zaretsky, The
Outer Limits ofFraudulentConveyance Law, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1992, at 3 (discussing
failure to achieve reasonably equivalent value as method of avoiding foreclosure sale);
9th Circuit, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 16, 1992 (indicating BFP was upheld); One Bankruptcy
Case Awaits Argument As U.S. Supreme Court Begins New Term, Bankr. Rep. (BNA)
(Oct. 4, 1993) (indicating BFP granted certiorari).
144 See In re BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148 (explaining that noncollusive, reasonablyconducted mortgage foreclosure sale is optimal method of defining reasonably
equivalent value under Federal Bankruptcy Code to preserve federal and state goals);
In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1139 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing Madrid)
(indicating foreclosure sale under § 548(a)(2)(A) should be consistent with state law);
In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), affd on other grounds, 725 F.2d
1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984) (adopting noncollusive, reasonablyconducted mortgage foreclosure sale as permissible method of achieving reasonably
equivalent value). But see Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir.
1988) (adopting case-by-case analysis of facts and circumstances to determine if reasonably equivalent value was achieved); Durrett,621 F.2d at 201 (noting if 70% of fair
market value achieved, foreclosure sale cannot be avoided for failing to obtain reasonably equivalent value under § 548(a)(2)(A)). See generally Gover & West, supra note
81, at 1062 (explaining Durrettrule and its adoption by courts).
145 See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
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If the Supreme Court rejects a noncollusive, regularly-conducted mortgage foreclosure sale as a presumptive method of
achieving reasonably equivalent value, this area of the law will
continue to be extremely nebulous, and a statutory solution will
remain necessary to guide practitioners in satisfying this requirement. 146 If the Supreme Court affirms a noncollusive, regularlyconducted foreclosure sale as a method of achieving reasonably
equivalent value, the proposed amendment will be beneficial to
the revision committee if they decide to amend section 548.147
CONCLUSION

The term "reasonably equivalent value," as currently utilized
in section 548 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, is a virtually impenetrable jungle. Radically inconsistent outcomes arise depending on the jurisdiction of the sale. Consequently, foreclosing parties desperately need some guidance in satisfying this vague
standard. This Note has suggested an amendment to section 548
that provides a clear and precise definition of reasonably
equivalent value for purposes of mortgage foreclosure. The proposed amendment encourages courts to balance all of the relevant
factors in light of the conflicting needs of mortgagees, mortgagors,
and potential purchasers at foreclosure sales. The result would be
much needed certainty in an area of the law filled with ambiguity.
Until an amendment is enacted, however, attorneys must understand how to reduce the probability that a court will avoid a
foreclosure sale as a fraudulent conveyance under section 548.
The articulated suggestions provide practitioners with a variety of
techniques aimed at satisfying the current statutory standard.
Decisions to undertake any or all of the recommendations will be
highly fact contingent and will require careful consideration of the
ramifications in light of costs, benefits, and jurisdiction. Despite
the problems besetting this amorphous area of law, it is hoped
that the suggested methodology will assist practitioners confronted with the difficulty of interpreting reasonably equivalent
value under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Scott Todd Salmonson
146 See notes 1-18 and accompanying text (demonstrating murkiness of reasonably equivalent value requirement).
147 See notes 27-95 and accompanying text (explaining merits of proposed statute
and reasons why such provisions are useful).

